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Appellant Kim Davis (“Davis”) hereby submits this Reply in support of her
motion for a stay pending appeal of the district court’s August 12, 2015 order.
INTRODUCTION
In opposing a stay pending appeal in this first-in-the-nation case, Plaintiffs
rehash and recycle theories that ignore enumerated constitutional and statutory rights
and outright flout the religious liberty analysis that the Supreme Court has described
as the “most demanding test known to constitutional law.”1 Although Plaintiffs are
ready to ride roughshod over Davis’ individual rights without a full hearing on the
merits of the undisputed constitutional “debate” and “conflict” engendered here, this
Court should allow neither Plaintiffs’ unrelenting desire to force Davis to abandon
her conscience nor the district court’s errors and similar rush to judgment to forever
displace Davis’ conscience and religious liberty. In a glaring omission to the merits
of a stay, Plaintiffs failed to address, let alone distinguish, prior stays pending appeal
granted by this Court in other marriage cases even though the effect of those stays
absolutely barred couples from obtaining marriage licenses (or having licenses
recognized) in their states (including Kentucky) and did not implicate irreversible
infringements upon a particular individual’s enumerated rights of conscience,
religious liberty, and speech, as are involved here. The substantial legal questions

1

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (discussing the
analogous federal RFRA).
1
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presented here, along with the balancing of the equities, warrant maintaining the
status quo and granting a stay until this appeal of first impression is finally resolved.
REPLY ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiffs’ claims and purported harms are neither clearly established
nor clearly defined by precedent from this Court or the Supreme Court.
In opposing a stay, Plaintiffs proclaim that they “should not have to wait any

longer to exercise their fundamental right to marry,” and declare that “marriage
licenses in Rowan County” are a “legal prerequisite for marriage in Kentucky,” see
Pls.’ Resp. to Emergency Mot. to Stay (“Pls.’ Resp.”), at 2, 16, but nothing (and no
one) is barring them from exercising the right to marry whom they want to marry in
Kentucky. Indisputably, Kentucky is recognizing marriages, including same-sex
“marriages,” so Plaintiffs can marry whom they want (even while this appeal is
pending). Also, Kentucky is providing for the issuance of marriage licenses in more
than 130 marriage licensing locations spread across the state, including many
locations within 30-45 minutes of where Plaintiffs allegedly reside, so Plaintiffs can
readily obtain Kentucky marriage licenses from any one of those locations (even
while this appeal is pending). Accordingly, the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims must be
evaluated in terms of the state-wide marriage licensing scheme and whether that
scheme, which is currently providing more than 130 locations for Plaintiffs to obtain
marriage licenses, directly and substantially burdens these Plaintiffs’ right to marry.

2
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Instead, Plaintiffs demand (and the district court erred in finding) a newfound
constitutional right to have a marriage license issued by a particular person in a
particular county, irrespective of the burdens placed upon that individual’s freedoms.
But no precedent from this Court or the Supreme Court (including Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015)) establishes a fundamental constitutional right to
obtain a marriage license in a particular county authorized and signed by a
particular person. According to Plaintiffs’ unprecedented view, and adopted in
error by the district court, the mere act of traveling approximately 30 minutes equates
to a federal constitutional violation of the right to marry and, not just that, but a
violation purportedly so manifest that it trumps individual conscience and religious
freedom protections that are enumerated in the Kentucky RFRA and the United
States and Kentucky Constitutions. But this alleged burden is no more
constitutionally suspect than having to drive 30 minutes to a government office (for
any reason) in the first place. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate, as they
must, a direct and substantial burden on their right to marry in Kentucky.
II.

The impending harms to Davis’ conscience, religious liberty, and free
speech rights are protected under the Kentucky RFRA and the United
States and Kentucky Constitutions.
In opposing a stay, Plaintiffs fundamentally misconstrue the applicability of

the Kentucky RFRA, which directly implicates the merits of the parties’ competing
claims and the balancing of harms engendered by this litigation.
3
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First, Kentucky marriage law cannot be interpreted without also considering
and applying the Kentucky RFRA. The Kentucky RFRA is housed under Chapter
446 of Kentucky’s statutes, which is entitled “Construction of Statutes,” and
includes such other generally applicable provisions as “Definitions for Statutes
Generally,” “Computation of Time,” “Severability,” and “Titles, Headings, and
Notes.” KY. REV. STAT. §§ 446.010, 446.030, 446.090, 446.140. Even more
specifically, the Kentucky RFRA is included under a section of Chapter 446 reserved
for “Rules of Codification.” Moreover, the Kentucky RFRA protects the religious
freedom of all “persons” in Kentucky.2 Thus, Plaintiffs’ declarations that “Kentucky
law specifically imposes upon County Clerks the obligation to issue” SSM licenses
and “Kentucky’s administrative scheme requires all county clerks to issue marriage
licenses,” see Pls.’ Resp., at 3, 8, fail to consider the necessary Kentucky RFRA
analysis embedded in any legislative or regulatory scheme, including Kentucky’s
state-wide marriage licensing scheme. This analysis, though necessary (albeit
untested) before June 26, 2015, is especially significant in the wake of Obergefell
and Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate. See also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a less restrictive alternative would serve the
Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.”) (emphasis added).
While “person” is not defined in the Kentucky RFRA, it is defined in
Kentucky’s general definitions statute to include “individuals,” and publicly elected
officials are not excluded. See KY. REV. STAT. § 446.010(33).
2
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Second, Plaintiffs hijack the substantial burden analysis under the Kentucky
RFRA. Critically, neither Plaintiffs nor the district court are arbiters of the burden
placed upon Davis’ religious beliefs, and their attempts to occupy that position usurp
and contradict clear Supreme Court precedent. Similar to the federal RFRA, the
Kentucky RFRA asks whether a government mandate (such as Gov. Beshear’s SSM
Mandate) “imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties” to act
“in accordance with their religious beliefs,” not, as Plaintiffs suggest, whether
Davis’ religious beliefs about authorizing SSM licenses are reasonable. See Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014) (emphasis in original).
Davis believes that providing the marriage authorization “demanded by” Gov.
Beshear’s SSM Mandate is “connected with” SSM “in a way that is sufficient to
make it immoral” for her to authorize the proposed union and place her name on it.
See id. Davis is not claiming that the mere “administrative” act of recording a
document, see, e.g., Pls.’ Resp., at 5, 11, 13-16, substantially burdens her religious
freedom. County clerks are not mere scriveners for recording a marriage document.
Instead, county clerks authorize the marriage license for the proposed union, place
their name on each and every license they authorize, and call the union “marriage.”
See KY. REV. STAT. § 402.100(1)-(3). Such participation in and approval of SSM
substantially burdens Davis’ religious freedom because she is the person authorizing
and approving a proposed union to be a “marriage,” which, in her sincerely-held
5
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religious beliefs, is not a marriage. She can neither call a proposed union “marriage”
which is not marriage in her view, nor authorize that union. Importantly, Davis is
not claiming a substantial burden on her religious freedom or free speech rights if
someone else authorizes and approves a SSM license devoid of her name. Davis is
also not claiming that her religious freedom or free speech rights are substantially
burdened if she must complete an opt-out form to be exempted from issuing SSM
licenses, as Kentucky law already permits for other licensing schemes.
Accordingly, it is not for Plaintiffs or the district court to say that Davis’
religious beliefs “are mistaken or insubstantial,” but instead the “‘narrow function .
. . in this context is to determine’ whether the line drawn reflects ‘an honest
conviction,’ and there is no dispute that it does.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 277879 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716
(1981)) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Davis holds sincerelyheld religious beliefs about marriage (see Pls.’ Resp., at 14)—the requisite “honest
conviction.” It is therefore improper to conclude that such beliefs are “incidental” or
“not ris[ing] to the level” of a substantial burden, see id. at 6, 8, 15-16, for that is
just another way of deeming Davis’ religious beliefs as “flawed,” which is a step
that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly refused to take.” See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct.
at 2778. But it is the exact leap that Plaintiffs invite, and the district court took in
error. By way of Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate, Davis is being threatened by loss of
6
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job, civil liability, punitive damages, sanctions, and private lawsuits in federal court
if she “refuse[s] to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief.”
KY. REV. STAT. § 446.350. Certainly, the Kentucky RFRA is designed to protect a
person from choosing between one’s lifelong career in the county clerk’s office and
one’s conscience, or between punitive damages and one’s religious liberty.
Third, the proffered compelling government interests that purportedly
overcome the burden on Davis’ religious freedom (i.e., eradicating discrimination
and uniformity in the issuance and recording of marriage licenses, see Pls.’ Resp., at
9) are the type of “broadly formulated” governmental interests that fail to satisfy
RFRA-based strict scrutiny because they do not show any actual harm in granting a
“specific exemption” to a “particular religious claimant.” See Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirata Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006). Providing
accommodation to Davis—who is treating all persons the same—neither endorses
discrimination nor prevents qualified individuals from uniformly acquiring
Kentucky marriage licenses from more than 130 marriage licensing locations.
Fourth, even if a compelling interest can be shown, this Court cannot ignore
application of the “exceptionally demanding” least-restrictive-means standard, and
the many less restrictive alternatives that would (1) provide Plaintiffs with a
marriage license in Rowan County, Kentucky and (2) simultaneously protect
Davis’ religious freedom. Plaintiffs’ silence on these numerous alternatives does not
7
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mute their availability, even if they cost more. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2780. The
Kentucky RFRA requires clear and convincing proof of both a particularized
compelling government interest in infringing Davis’ religious freedom and the least
restrictive means for achieving that interest. In Plaintiffs’ view, only a “uniform
system” that provides no religious accommodation whatsoever is possible, and
permissible. See Pls.’ Resp., at 10. But legislative enactments in other states, such as
North Carolina and Utah, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-5.5, and Utah S.B. 297
(2015 Gen. Sess.), and proposals in this state, demonstrate the intolerance and
manifest error of this view, see, e.g., D.E. 39-6, An Act Relating to Marriage, Ky.
House Bill 101 (2016 Reg. Sess.). Plaintiffs’ conclusion also disregards that
“government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices,” Hobbie
v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987), and
repudiates the Sixth Circuit’s finding that “[o]ur Nation’s history is replete with . . .
accommodation of religion.” ACLU v. Mercer County, Ky., 432 F.3d 624, 639 (6th
Cir. 2005). Thus, despite providing lip service that courts are to “strike a balance”
between rights, see Pls.’ Resp., at 7, Plaintiffs, in fact, demand unrelenting adherence
and submission to their orthodoxy—that in all places, and under any circumstances,
SSM trumps a person’s religious liberty when the two conflict, despite the measuredin-millenia history of marriage as exclusively a union between a man and a woman,
and despite Davis’ undisputed sincerely-held religious beliefs about marriage.
8
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Accommodating sincere religious beliefs and actions (or non-actions) motivated by
those beliefs promotes the religious pluralism and tolerance that have made this
country distinctive. Plainly, this is not a situation where an accommodation of Davis’
religious objections will swallow the general law on marriage and marriage licenses
in Kentucky, because licenses are readily available in more than 130 marriage
licensing offices throughout Kentucky.
Finally, Plaintiffs also advance a “third party beneficiary” argument that was
squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby. “Nothing” in the Kentucky
RFRA supports giving the government “an entirely free hand to impose burdens on
religious exercise so long as those burdens confer a benefit on other individuals,”
for if any governmental act is construed as benefiting a third party then all
government actions can be deemed “entitlements to which nobody could object on
religious grounds, rendering RFRA meaningless.” See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at
2781, n. 37. But here the government can “readily arrange” for means of providing
Kentucky marriage licenses to the Plaintiffs who are “unable to obtain them . . . due
to [Davis’] religious objections,” id., thereby abrogating Plaintiffs’ concern about
“exemptions” that allegedly “adversely impact others.” See Pls.’ Resp., at 10.
III.

As the district court did in its Injunction, Plaintiffs want this Court to
short-circuit the public interest at stake in this lawsuit.
The public has no interest in coercing Davis to irreversibly violate her

conscience and religious freedom when ample less restrictive alternatives are readily
9
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available. See, e.g., Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher, 70 F.3d
1474, 1490 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that the public has a “significant interest” in the
“protection of First Amendment liberties”); O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 1010 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[P]ursuant to RFRA,
there is a strong public interest in the free exercise of religion even where that interest
may conflict with [another legislative scheme].”).
REPLY CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in prior briefing, Davis respectfully
requests that this Court grant immediate consideration and enter an order staying the
district court’s August 12, 2015 order pending resolution of the appeal in this Court.3
DATED: August 25, 2015
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3

In any event, and out of an abundance of caution, if this Court denies a stay
pending appeal, Davis further asks this Court to grant a temporary stay for Davis to
submit an emergency application for a stay to the Supreme Court.
10

Case: 15-5880

Document: 27

Filed: 08/25/2015

Page: 12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 25th day of August, 2015, I caused the foregoing
document to be filed electronically with the Court, where it is available for viewing
and downloading from the Court’s ECF system, and that such electronic filing
automatically generates a Notice of Electronic Filing constituting service of the filed
document upon the following:
William Ellis Sharp
ACLU of Kentucky
315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300
Louisville, KY 40202
sharp@aclu-ky.org

Daniel Mach
ACLU Foundation
915 15th Street, NW, Suite 6th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
dmach@aclu.org

Daniel J. Canon
Laura E. Landenwich
Leonard Joe Dunman
Clay Daniel Walton Adams, PLC
462 S. Fourth Street, Suite 101
Louisville, KY 40202
dan@justiceky.com
laura@justiceky.com
joe@justiceky.com

James D. Esseks
Ria Tabacco Mar
ACLU Foundation
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
jesseks@aclu.org
rmar@aclu.org

Counsel for Appellees

/s/ Jonathan D. Christman
Jonathan D. Christman
Liberty Counsel
P.O. Box 540774
Orlando, Florida 32854
(800) 671-1776
jchristman@lc.org

